Abstract-A keystream generator, known as RC4, consisting of a permutation table that slowly varies in time under the control of itself, is analyzed by the linear model approach. The objective is to find linear relations among the keystream bits that hold with probability different from one half by using the linear sequential circuit approximation method. To estimate the corresponding correlation coefficients, some interesting correlation properties of random Boolean functions are derived. It is thus shown that the second binary derivative of the least significant bit output sequence is correlated to 1 with the correlation coefficient close to 15 1 2 03n where n is the variable word size of RC4.
I. INTRODUCTION
A NY keystream generator for practical stream cipher applications can generally be represented as an autonomous finite-state machine whose initial state and possibly the nextstate and output functions as well are secret-key-dependent. A common type of keystream generators consists of a number of possibly irregularly clocked linear feedback shift registers (LFSR's) that are combined by a function with or without memory. Standard cryptographic criteria such as a large period, a high linear complexity, and good statistical properties are thus relatively easily satisfied (see [16] and [17] ), but such a generator may in principle be vulnerable to various divideand-conquer attacks in the known plaintext (or ciphertext-only) scenario, where the objective is to reconstruct the secretkey-controlled LFSR initial states from the known keystream sequence (for a survey see [7] and [17] ).
Most attacks require an exhaustive search over the initial states of a subset of the LFSR's, with the exception of a small number of faster cryptanalytic attacks which may work for long LFSR's as well, such as fast correlation attacks [13] based on iterative probabilistic decoding, the conditional Manuscript received March 8, 1998 ; revised September 16, 1998 . The material in this paper was presented in part at Eurocrypt '97, Konstantz, Germany, May 1997. Part of this work was performed while the author was on leave at the Isaac Newton Institute for Mathematical Sciences, Cambridge, U.K.
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correlation attack [14] based on information set decoding, and the inversion attack [10] , all on regularly clocked LFSR's, and a specific fast correlation attack on irregularly clocked LFSR's whose theoretical framework is developed in [8] . In practice, the initial state is for resynchronization purposes made dependent on a randomizing key, which is typically sent in the clear before every new message to be encrypted. This may open new possibilities for cryptanalytic attacks (see [2] ).
In the open literature, there is a very small number of proposed keystream generators that are not based on shift registers. For example, an interesting design approach, which may have originated from the table-shuffling principle [12] , is to use a relatively big table that slowly varies in time under the control of itself. A keystream generator [15] publicized in [18] and known as RC4 (although a public confirmation is still missing) is such an example, which is according to [18] widely used in many commercial products and standards, including Lotus Notes, Apple Computer's AOCE, Oracle Secure SQL, the Cellular Digital Packet Data specification [1] , and Secure Sockets Layer standard SSL 3.0. Another, somewhat similar example is a keystream generator called ISAAC [11] . Of course, one may also use a set of tables controlling each other, but this may lead to some divide-and-conquer attacks.
The resulting schemes are hardly analyzable, and about the only known theoretical argument [4] concerns the period of the internal state sequence, but has probabilistic rather than deterministic nature. Namely, if the internal memory size is bits and if the next-state function is randomly chosen according to the uniform distribution, then the average cycle and tail lengths are both around , whereas if the nextstate function is in addition required to be invertible, then the internal state period (cycle length) is uniformly distributed between and , with the average value . The statistical properties of the keystream sequence are typically measured by standard statistical tests, and for some sequences, including the LFSR ones, theoretical results can be derived as well. For keystream generators like RC4, such theoretical results are difficult to establish. The results typically deal with the relative frequency of occurrence of blocks of successive symbols within a period, where the block size is assumed to be smaller than the internal memory size. However, it is shown in [9] that for block sizes bigger than , a linear statistical weakness or a so-called linear model always exists and can be efficiently determined by the linear sequential circuit approximation (LSCA) method [6] .
The linear statistical weakness is a linear relation among the keystream bits that holds with probability different from one half. It turns out [9] that for many practical schemes, including 0018-9448/99$10.00 © 1999 IEEE the clock-controlled LFSR's, the keystream sequence length needed to detect the weakness is considerably shorter than the period. Although the weakness may not lead to a significant plaintext uncertainty reduction (in the known ciphertext scenario), it is structure-dependent and may be used as such to distinguish between different types of keystream generators and for secret key reconstruction (in the known plaintext scenario). As well, linear models of individual components of a keystream generator can be utilized in correlation attacks, whereas multiple linear models can also be used to mount fast correlation attacks [8] on clock-controlled LFSR's.
The main objective of this paper is to derive linear models for RC4 by using the Linear Sequential Circuit Approximation (LSCA) method [6] , [9] . The LSCA method consists in determining and solving a linear sequential circuit that approximates a given keystream generator and yields linear models with comparatively large correlation coefficient , where the probability of the corresponding linear relation among the keystream bits is . It also gives an estimate of , but sometimes, as in the case of RC4, special techniques have to be developed to obtain more accurate estimates.
Given a parameter , the internal state of RC4 consists of a balanced table (permutation) of different binary words of dimension and two pointer binary words of the same dimension which, at each time, define the positions of two words in the table to be swapped to produce the table at the next time. The internal memory size 1 is thus practically given as . One of the pointers is updated by using the table content at the position defined by the other, which is in turn updated in a known way by a counter. Initially, the two pointer words are set to zero and the table content is defined by the secret key in a specified way. At each time, the output of RC4 is a binary word of dimension which is taken from an appropriate position in the table. The output word is then bitwise added to the plaintext word to give the ciphertext word.
Let denote the least significant bit output sequence of RC4 and let and denote its first and second binary derivatives, respectively. Our main results are to show that is correlated neither to nor to and that is correlated to with the correlation coefficient close to for large . Since the output sequence length needed to detect a statistical weakness with the correlation coefficient is , the required length is around . For example, if , as recommended in most applications, the required length is close to . Experimental results agree well with the above theoretical predictions.
As the resulting correlation coefficient is significantly bigger than , , the determined linear model 1 The effective internal memory size is slightly smaller and is according to Stirling approximation given as log 2 n ! + 2n 2 n (n 0 log e) + 5n=2 + log p 2:
All the logarithms are to the base 2 throughout.
should be regarded as a statistical weakness, at least on a theoretical level. Moreover, the output sequence length required for the detection may even be realistic in highspeed applications if . Also note that the second binary derivative weakness involves only three successive least significant output bits, which is much smaller than the memory size. The weakness is a consequence of a very simple nextstate function of RC4. It is also shown that similar linear relations hold for other output bits as well, but the correlation coefficients are smaller.
In Section II, a more detailed description of the RC4 keystream generator is presented. In Section III, some relevant correlation properties of random Boolean functions are derived, while the linear models of RC4 and the corresponding correlation coefficients are determined in Section IV. A summary and conclusions are given in Section V. Central moments of underlying discrete probability distributions needed for estimating the correlation coefficients are evaluated in the Appendix.
II. DESCRIPTION OF RC4
We follow the description given in [18] . RC4 is in fact a family of algorithms indexed by a parameter , which is a positive integer typically recommended to be equal to . The internal state of RC4 at time consists of a table (permutation) of different -bit words and of two pointer -bit words and . So, the internal memory size is . Let the output -bit word of RC4 at time be denoted by . The -bit words are treated as binary representations of integers. Let initially . Then the next-state and output functions of RC4 are for every defined by
where all the additions are modulo . It is assumed that all the words except for the swapped ones remain the same (swapping itself is effective only if ). The output -bit word sequence is . The initial table is defined in terms of the key string by incorporating this string into the RC4 nextstate function starting from the table (identity permutation) . More precisely, set and for every , compute and then swap with . The last produced table represents
. The key string is composed of the secret key, possibly repeated, and of the randomizing key which is sent in the clear for resynchronization purposes.
There are no published results regarding RC4. The known pointer sequence ensures that every element in the table is affected by swapping at least once at any successive times and, also, that the next-state function is invertible (one-to-one). Accordingly, the state diagram consists of cycles only, which, according to [4] , can be expected to have average length close to and are very unlikely to be short if . Of course, since the next-state function of RC4 is not randomly chosen, this remains to be proved, if possible at all.
III. CORRELATION PROPERTIES OF RANDOM BOOLEAN FUNCTIONS
The correlation coefficients of the linear models of RC4 to be determined in the next section are closely related to certain correlation properties of random Boolean functions. These properties provide insight into the linear statistical weaknesses of RC4, but are also useful for the correlation linear cryptanalysis of any keystream generator based on timevariant Boolean functions. Note that the correlation properties of Boolean functions for cryptographic applications are first introduced in [19] . Let denote an arbitrary Boolean function of variables and let denote the value of at a point . We will use the same notation, , for the corresponding integer . A Boolean function is called balanced if it has the same number of zeros and ones in its truth table (a balanced vectorial Boolean function is defined analogously). In the probabilistic analysis to follow, we will, for simplicity, keep the same notation for the random variables and their values.
As usual, the correlation coefficient between any two binary random variables and is defined as
The correlation coefficient of a single binary random variable is defined as the correlation coefficient between and the constant zero variable. Accordingly, let, for any two Boolean functions and , denote the correlation coefficient between and , and let stand for , where is uniformly distributed. A basic result to be used is that the correlation coefficient of a sum 2 of independent binary random variables is equal to the product of their individual correlation coefficients (see [9] ). Proof: Let denote the correlation coefficient between and for any fixed . The correlation coefficient is then equal to the expected value of , , over uniformly random . The correlation coefficient is clearly equal to the correlation coefficient of which is, in turn, equal to the product of the correlation coefficients of and , as and are independent. As the two are equal, we get that . Since is fixed, , where is itself given as with being 2 Addition of binary variables is modulo 2 throughout.
the number of zeros in the truth and has the probability distribution Therefore, (7) directly follows, and the asymptotics (8) is a consequence of (41) from the Appendix. Proof: The correlation coefficient of is the expected value over random of the correlation coefficient of for random and a fixed which is itself independent of , since is clearly for any . The correlation coefficient is then A similar argument applies to a uniformly random balanced such that , but then is equal to for any , where being the number of zeros in the half of the truth table of where . The rest follows directly. (The first part of this proposition can also be obtained from the second part and the proof of Proposition 3.) Propositions 4-6 are crucial for deriving the linear models of RC4 in the following section. More generally, the preceding propositions are also useful for the correlation linear cryptanalysis of any keystream generator based on slowly varying Boolean functions. For example, consider a timevariant memoryless combiner which consists of a number of shift registers combined by a Boolean function that slowly changes in time under the control of another generator (e.g., see [5] or [12] ). The bitwise correlation coefficient between the output sequence and any linear combination of the input shift register sequences is then equal to zero, according to the case in Proposition 2, for random Boolean functions, and in Proposition 4, for random balanced Boolean functions.
However, consider any sum of output bits that are close to each other so that the combining function can be approximated as being the same for all of them. If the corresponding inputs producing the given output bits are regarded as independent and uniformly distributed random variables, then the correlation coefficient between the output sum and the sum of any given linear function of the corresponding inputs is well approximated by Proposition 2, if the combining function is not necessarily balanced, and by Proposition 4, if the combining function is always balanced (for , also see Propositions 1 and 3, respectively). Accordingly, if is odd, then the correlation coefficient is equal to zero, but if is even, then the correlation coefficient, perhaps unexpectedly, is necessarily different from zero if the input linear function is not the constant zero. If the input linear function is the constant zero, then the correlation coefficient is also different from zero for even , when the combining function is not necessarily balanced. This then represents a linear statistical weakness of the output sequence. In particular, if the chosen input linear function is any individual binary input, then the established correlation property can be used to mount a fast correlation attack [13] on the corresponding linear feedback shift register.
IV. LINEAR MODELS
The essence of the linear sequential circuit approximation (LSCA) method [6] , [9] applied to binary keystream generators is in finding good linear approximations to the output and the component next-state functions and in solving the resulting linear sequential circuit. Its objective is to obtain feedforward linear transforms (i.e., linear sequential transforms with finite input memory) of the output sequence that are correlated to linear transforms of sequences depending on the initial state variables (to be used in correlation attacks). In particular, an output linear transform correlated to the constant zero sequence defines a linear relation among the output bits that holds with probability different from one half. The resulting probabilistic linear recursion is called a linear model [9] . Estimating the correlation coefficients can be a problem on its own. In the underlying probabilistic model, the initial state is assumed to be random and uniformly distributed, and if the next-state function is one-to-one, then the internal state at any time is also uniformly distributed, so that the resulting correlation coefficients are time-independent (see [9] ).
In the case of RC4, the next-state function is one-to-one and the balanced initial table (each -bit word appears exactly once) can be assumed to be uniformly random, but the initial pointer words and are both fixed to zero. It follows that for every , the table is uniformly random and balanced, whereas is deterministic and known and is uniformly distributed for , but dependent on . As a consequence, while the dependence between and is insignificant, the deterministic nature of may in principle lead to linear models with time-dependent correlation coefficients. A related approach is to fix the initial state and to consider the same linear relation at random times, in which case the average value of the correlation coefficient over time is relevant. If the tail and cycle lengths combined are big (as one should expect for RC4), then the obtained correlation coefficient should be close to the value corresponding to a fixed time and a random initial state.
Since RC4 has binary outputs, one should first decide on a linear combination of these outputs to be linearly approximated. To maximize the correlation coefficients, we will consider the individual binary outputs. Let , , , and denote the th components of , , , and , respectively, , where corresponds to the least significant bit of the corresponding -bit words. Note that defines a uniformly random balanced vectorial Boolean function , so that is a uniformly random balanced Boolean function of variables. As the linearization of and necessarily involves finding linear approximations to , the problem is to find such approximations leading to the correlation coefficients that do not vanish for a random .
The main point of the LSCA method applied to RC4 is that can be approximated by , because of the slow change of the table due to swapping. Another point is that can be approximated by any linear function of its inputs, but to maximize the overall correlation coefficient, is approximated by its th binary input. As before, all the additions of -bit words are integer additions modulo (usually, or ). As a result, we get where is linearized exactly twice. It then follows that where is known for every . The total number of linear approximations needed is at most five. In order for the overall correlation coefficient not to vanish, the total number of linear approximations to should be even, because positive and negative correlation coefficients would otherwise cancel out (see Proposition 4) . It will be shown in Section IV-A that the number of required linear approximations is equal to five. So, the first binary derivative of any binary component of thedimensional output sequence does not represent a linear model with a nonzero correlation coefficient.
Further, by adding two successive bits of the first binary derivative sequence we get that which is equal to if and can be approximated as if . The total number of linear approximations needed for this is at most ten and will be shown in Section IV-B to be equal to six. Accordingly, the second binary derivative of any binary component of the output sequence defines a linear model with a nonzero correlation coefficient. The most significant correlation coefficient is obtained for the least significant bit, that is, for (see Section IV-B). Other linear models of RC4 should have smaller or much smaller correlation coefficients.
A. First Binary Derivative
Our objective here is to estimate the correlation coefficient between the first binary derivative and for any . For odd , , and for even , . Letting , , , and , we have (9) where is uniformly distributed for any , is a uniformly random balanced vectorial Boolean function, and is obtained from by a uniformly random swapping of two -bit words, whereas is fixed for any particular and is uniformly distributed for a random .
We can then establish the following series of successive linear approximations: (10)- (12) and (14) hold with the correlation coefficients 3 , , , and , respectively, where and are fixed and is either uniformly distributed or fixed. This is because the arguments of all the functions approximated are uniformly distributed if is such. is produced from by a uniformly random swapping of two bits, then according to Lemma 1, for any fixed and , the linear approximation in (13) holds with the correlation coefficient (conditioned on ), where takes values and each with probability . The linear approximation in (15) holds for any fixed with the correlation coefficient if is a uniformly random balanced Boolean function with a fixed correlation coefficient to (see Proposition 5). The only tractable way of computing the correlation coefficient of all the linear approximations combined is by assuming that the individual approximations are independent when conditioned on and . Under this so-called independence assumption, the correlation coefficient between and is equal to , where , if is a uniformly random balanced Boolean function with a fixed correlation coefficient to , where is either uniformly distributed or fixed. The resulting correlation coefficient conditioned on and is thus equal to . As and are assumed to be independent, the overall correlation coefficient is then where the expectations are over random and , respectively. Note that can be expressed as where (standing for the number of zeros in the half of the truth table of where ) has the probability distribution (see Proposition 4). Since the odd central moments of this distribution are equal to zero (see the Appendix), we finally have that .
B. Second Binary Derivative
Our objective now is to estimate the correlation coefficient between the second binary derivative and , for any . Letting , , , , and , we have (16) where is uniformly distributed for any , is a uniformly random balanced vectorial Boolean function, and and are obtained from by one and two uniformly random swappings of two -bit words, respectively, whereas is fixed for any particular and is uniformly distributed for a random .
The direct computation of the correlation coefficient by using (16) Proposition 4) . It is crucial to observe that the exponent is even, so that is necessarily different from zero. The asymptotics as increases is proved in the Appendix. Equation (23) together with (25) and (30)-(32) then determines the overall correlation coefficient which can be easily computed for any of interest, and, as increases, we have
The sequence length required to detect with high probability the second binary derivative statistical weakness is [9] , that is, neglecting a small constant less than
Since the memory size of RC4 is , we get that . For example, for we computed the following values for and : and , and , and , respectively. In fact, for , the approximation to included in (32) is also very good. The estimates of obtained by computer simulations for and are and , respectively. The first estimate is an average value for five output sequences each of length and the second one is an average value for ten output sequences each of length , where each sequence is produced from a randomly chosen initial state. One may observe that the estimates are roughly 50% smaller that the values predicted by theory. This shows that the influence of the utilized linear approximations being dependent is relatively small. The difference may also be due to the fact that the correlation coefficient estimates are essentially obtained by averaging over time rather than over random initial states.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The linear model approach aiming at finding linear relations among the keystream bits that hold with probability different from one half is applied to the RC4 keystream generator. It is first shown by the linear sequential circuit approximation method that the first and the second binary derivatives of the least significant bit output sequence may yield such linear relations. A specific technique involving correlation properties of random balanced Boolean functions is then developed to study the corresponding correlation coefficients. It is thus proved that the correlation coefficient for the first binary derivative is equal to zero and, more importantly, that the correlation coefficient between the second binary derivative and is around where is the word size of RC4. The derived theoretical result agrees well with the experimental results obtained by computer simulations. The obtained correlation properties of random Boolean functions are also used to establish some interesting correlation weaknesses of a time-variant binary memoryless combiner, which consists of a number of shift registers combined by a slowly changing Boolean function.
The output sequence length needed to detect the corresponding linear statistical weakness of RC4 is then around , which is significantly smaller than , where is the memory size, and may even be realistic in highspeed applications. Although the resulting plaintext uncertainty reduction may not be practically important unless is small, the determined linear model can be used to distinguish RC4 from other keystream generators and, also, to recover the unknown parameter . Whether the linear model indicates that the initial state reconstruction from the known output sequence may also be possible remains to be further investigated.
APPENDIX
First, consider a discrete probability distribution where is a positive integer. For any positive integer , the central moment of this probability distribution is defined as
Our objective here is to study the asymptotics of as increases. First note that if is odd. Assume then that is even. The starting point is to use the well-known normal approximation to the binomial coefficients, obtained by Stirling formula ,
where is the normal probability density function (see [3] ). In particular (37) Accordingly, for any fixed integer , we obtain (38) More generally, the approximations (36) and (38) also hold uniformly in on any interval where (see [3] ). As a consequence, we get 
